Quantum Information Theoretical Analysis of Various Constructions for
  Quantum Secret Sharing by Rietjens, Karin et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
02
00
9v
1 
 1
 F
eb
 2
00
5
Quantum Information Theoretical Analysis of
Various Constructions for Quantum Secret Sharing
Karin Rietjens
Dep. of Math. and Comp. Science
Eindhoven University of Technology
The Netherlands
Email: k.p.t.rietjens@tue.nl
Berry Schoenmakers
Dep. of Math. and Comp. Science
Eindhoven University of Technology
The Netherlands
Email: berry@win.tue.nl
Pim Tuyls
Information Security Systems
Philips Research Eindhoven
The Netherlands
Email: pim.tuyls@philips.com
Abstract— Recently, an information theoretical model for
Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) schemes was introduced. By
using this model, we prove that pure state Quantum Threshold
Schemes (QTS) can be constructed from quantum MDS codes
and vice versa. In particular, we consider stabilizer codes and
give a constructive proof of their relation with QTS. Furthermore,
we reformulate the Monotone Span Program (MSP) construction
according to the information theoretical model and check the
recoverability and secrecy requirement. Finally, we consider QSS
schemes which are based on quantum teleportation.
I. INTRODUCTION
QSS schemes are used to share a quantum secret among
a set of players such that only specific groups of players
are able to reconstruct the secret (authorized sets), while
all other groups have no information about the secret at all
(unauthorized sets). The collection of unauthorized sets is
called the adversary structure, which has the property that
every subset of an unauthorized set is also unauthorized.
In [11], an information theoretical model for a QSS scheme
was defined. This model is used throughout the rest of this
paper and is repeated here. Suppose one wants to share a
secret S which is an element of a q-dimensional Hilbert
space HS , where q usually is a prime power. The elements
{|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |q − 1〉} form an orthonormal basis for HS and
we usually describe the state of the secret by its orthonormal
decomposition ρS =
∑
i∈Fq
αi|i〉〈i|. The reference system that
purifies the state of S is denoted by R with corresponding
Hilbert space HR. Finally, the secret is shared among a
set of players P = {P1, . . . , Pn} and the Hilbert space
corresponding to a set B ⊆ P is denoted by HB . The density
matrix ρB then describes the state of system B.
The model is defined as follows. We denote the mutual
information between systems R and A by I(R : A) = S(R)+
S(A)−S(RA), where S(A) is the Von Neumann entropy of
the state ρA of system A.
Definition 1: A QSS scheme realizing an adversary struc-
ture A is described by a quantum operator which generates
quantum shares from a quantum secret S and distributes these
among the players such that:
1) recoverability requirement:
for all A /∈ A we have that I(R : A) = I(R : S);
2) secrecy requirement:
for all B ∈ A we have that I(R : B) = 0.
A scheme that satisfies these conditions is called a perfect
scheme. In a non-perfect scheme, some sets have some
information about the secret, but not enough to recover it, i.e.
0 6= I(R : B) < I(R : S) for some unauthorized set B.
In this paper, we investigate Quantum Threshold Schemes
(QTS) and their relation with Quantum Error Correcting Codes
(QECC). In [6], it was shown that a ((t, 2t − 1)) QTS can
be constructed from a [[2t − 1, 1, t]]k quantum code. Here,
we give an information theoretical proof of this relation and
also prove the reverse statement. In particular, we consider
stabilizer codes and constructively show how these codes can
be used for secret sharing. It is possible to compute the reduced
density matrix of a subset of shares, by only making use of
the properties of the stabilizer.
Furthermore, we reformulate the Monotone Span Program
(MSP) construction [8] for a general adversary structure ac-
cording to Definition 1. By directly computing the reduced
density matrix of a set of shares, we verify that the recover-
ability and secrecy requirement are satisfied.
Finally, the construction of a non-perfect ((n, n)) QTS using
teleportation, as was proposed in [9], is reformulated in terms
of the information theoretical model. We show that authorized
sets satisfy the recoverability requirement, but unauthorized
sets have some, but not enough, information about the secret.
II. PURE AND MIXED STATE QSS SCHEMES
In a pure state scheme, the encoding of a pure state of
the secret is a pure state, while with a mixed state scheme the
encoding of a pure state is sometimes a mixed state. In general,
a QSS scheme is mixed, but it can be described as a pure
scheme with one share discarded [7]. Therefore, it actually
suffices to only consider pure state schemes, which have the
following useful property. Part of it was previously considered
in [11], but a full proof is given here.
Theorem 2: In a pure state QSS scheme, the recoverability
requirement and the secrecy requirement are equivalent.
Proof: Suppose P is the set of all players and let A,B ⊆
P such that B = P \A. Using the Araki-Lieb inequality and
the fact that the systems RS and RAB are in a pure state, we
have
I(R : S)− I(R : A) = I(R : B) (1)
and the theorem follows immediately.
Note that this also implies that in a pure state scheme, the
authorized sets are precisely the complements of the unautho-
rized sets and vice versa. Moreover, this implies that a pure
state ((t, n)) QTS satisfies n = 2t− 1.
III. QSS WITH QUANTUM MDS CODES
In the classical case, a linear (t, n) threshold scheme over
Fq can be constructed from an [n + 1, t, n + 2 − t]q MDS
code and vice versa [1]. We show that in the quantum case, a
[[2t − 1, 1, t]]q quantum MDS code can be used to construct
a ((t, 2t − 1)) QTS and vice versa. As a special case,
binary stabilizer codes are considered and the recoverability
requirement is checked by directly computing the entropies
of the reduced density matrices of a subset of shares.
A quantum code can correct for erasures on a subsystem
of the system of the codewords means that the operator
that induces the erasures is perfectly reversible. The quantum
data processing inequality [3] gives a necessary and sufficient
condition for a quantum operator to be perfectly reversible.
A different condition for quantum erasure correcting is
given by Theorem 4. Cerf et al. [4] previously proved the
necessity of this condition. First we need the following lemma,
which is given without proof.
Lemma 3: Let A and B be two quantum systems. If A or
B is in a pure state, then the composite system AB is in a
product state.
Theorem 4: Let Q be a quantum system and let R be its
reference system, such that RQ is in a pure state. Erasures
can be corrected on some subsystem Qe of Q if and only if
I(R : Qe) = 0.
Proof: Let Q = QuQe and suppose we can correct
for erasures on Qe. This means that every quantum operator
acting on Qe and leaving Qu invariant is perfectly reversible.
Let E be a quantum operator that converts the system Qe
into an arbitrary pure state and let ρR′Q′uQ′e be the system
ρRQuQe after applying I ⊗ I ⊗ E . Then ρR′Q′uQ′e is in the
product state ρR′Q′u ⊗ ρQ′e (Lemma 3) and S(R′Q′uQ′e) =
S(R′Q′u) + S(Q′e) = S(RQu) + S(Q′e). Analogously, we
have that S(QuQ′e) = S(Qu)+S(Q′e). Furthermore, because
of the quantum data processing inequality we have S(Q) =
S(Q′)− S(R′Q′) and therefore
0 = S(Q)− S(Q′) + S(R′Q′)
= S(R)− S(QuQ′e) + S(RQuQ′e)
= S(R)− S(Qu)− S(Q′e) + S(RQu) + S(Q′e)
= S(R)− S(RQe) + S(Qe) = I(R : Qe), (2)
which completes the first part of the proof.
On the other hand, suppose I(R : Qe) = 0 for some
subsystem Qe of Q. Let E be a quantum operator acting on
Qe. Then E has a representation as a unitary evolution on a
larger system, say QeE, where E is initially in a pure state.
Let R′Q′E′ be the system RQE after this unitary evolution
on QeE and leaving RQu invariant. Then because of the
conservation rule for mutual information (see for example
[10]) we have that
I(R′ : Q′eE′) = I(R : QeE). (3)
Since E was initially in a pure state, we have (using Lemma
3)
I(R : QeE) = S(R) + S(QeE)− S(RQeE)
= S(R) + S(Qe) + S(E)− S(RQe)− S(E)
= I(R : Qe). (4)
Furthermore, because of the strong subadditivity property for
system R′Q′eE′ we have
I(R′ : Q′eE′)− I(R′ : E′) ≥ 0, (5)
which implies that
0 ≤ I(R′ : E′) ≤ I(R′ : Q′eE′) = I(R : Qe). (6)
Thus if I(R : Qe) = 0 then also I(R′ : E′) = 0, which
is equivalent to S(Q) = S(Q′) − S(R′Q′) and therefore
because of the quantum data processing inequality erasures
can be corrected on Qe.
Now we have the tools to prove the general relation between
quantum MDS codes and QTS.
Theorem 5: A ((t, 2t − 1)) QTS, where the secret is an
element of a q-dimensional Hilbert space, can be translated
into a [[2t− 1, 1, t]]q quantum MDS code and vice versa.
Proof: Consider a ((t, 2t − 1)) QTS with system S of
the secret, reference system R and system of the players P .
Then the secrecy requirement states that for every set of at
most t − 1 players B, we have I(R : B) = 0. According
to Theorem 4, we have that erasures can be corrected on the
shares of any set of t− 1 players. Hence, all possible sets of
shares in P together form a [[2t− 1, 1, t]]q QECC.
On the other hand, consider a [[2t−1, 1, t]]q quantum MDS
code. We claim that each codeword can be the shares for a
((t, 2t − 1)) QTS. Indeed, if Q is the composite system of
the codewords and R the reference system, then for every set
Qe of at most t − 1 of the 2t− 1 subsystems of Q we have
I(R : Qe) = 0 (Theorem 4). Hence, the secrecy requirement
is satisfied. Moreover, because of Theorem 2 and the fact that
a ((t, 2t− 1)) QTS is a pure state scheme, we also have that
the recoverability requirement is satisfied.
Stabilizer Codes
We consider a [[2t− 1, 1, t]]2 quantum stabilizer code with
stabilizer T . We show that this code can be used to construct
a ((t, 2t− 1)) QTS and verify the recoverability requirement,
which is sufficient because the scheme is pure. First, we
present the following technical lemma.
Lemma 6: Let W ∈ Gn, where Gn denotes the Pauli group
on n qubits, act on a composite quantum system Q = Q1⊗Q2
and say W =W1⊗W2, where Wi acts on system Qi, i = 1, 2.
Suppose |ψ〉 is a state of system Q that is stabilized by W .
If ρ2 = tr1(|ψ〉〈ψ|), where tr1 is the trace over system Q1,
then W2 and ρ2 commute with each other.
Proof: Let A be an arbitrary quantum operator acting on
the state space of system Q2 and tr2 the trace over system
Q2. Then we have
tr2(ρ2A) = tr2
(
tr1(W |ψ〉〈ψ|W †)A
)
= tr2
(
W2ρ2W
†
2A
)
, (7)
where we have used that the trace function is cyclic and the
fact that W †1W1 = I if W1 is a tensor product of Pauli
matrices. Since this holds for any A acting on the state space
of system Q2 we have that ρ2 = W2ρ2W †2 which completes
the proof.
Next let T be generated by {G1, . . . , G2t−2} and let X
and Z be the logical Pauli X and Z operators on the logical
basis {|0L〉, |1L〉} for the stabilizer code (see [10]). Then
{G1, . . . , G2t−2, X, Z} forms a basis for the commutator
C(T ) of T . Since an MDS code is pure [5], we have that
T has minimum distance t+ 1 and C(T ) minimum distance
t. This results in the following property, which we mention
here without proof.
Lemma 7: If we restrict the generators of C(T ) to at most
t − 1 qubit positions, then the restricted generators of C(T )
remain independent.
We claim that the construction for the ((t, 2t−1)) threshold
scheme is given by the following isometry.
Definition 8: The mapping Vt,2t−1 : C2 → (C2)⊗2t−1 is
defined by
Vt,2t−1(α0|0〉+ α1|1〉) = α0|0L〉+ α1|1L〉, (8)
where α0, α1 ∈ C.
So if the secret is in state ρS = α0|0〉〈0|+α1|1〉〈1|, the state
of the system of the shares P is given by
ρP = Vt,2t−1ρSV
†
t,2t−1 = α0|0L〉〈0L|+ α1|1L〉〈1L|. (9)
The entropy of every possible subset of shares from P is
given by the following lemmas.
Lemma 9: Let B ⊂ P with |B| = t′ ≤ t−1. Then we have
for the entropy of the state ρB of system B
S(B) = t′ log 2. (10)
Proof: Suppose B is a set of t− 1 qubits. Let G′j be the
operator Gj restricted to the qubit positions of B for every
1 ≤ j ≤ 2t − 2. Because of Lemma 6, these operators G′j
all commute with ρB . Moreover, because of Lemma 7, the
operators G′j are still independent. Since ρB is a 2t−1× 2t−1
density matrix that commutes with 2t−2 independent elements
in Gt−1 we have that ρB = 1/2t−1I . In general, for any set
B of at most t− 1 shares, say t′, we have that ρB = 1/2t′I .
Lemma 10: Let A ⊂ P with |A| = t. Then we have for the
entropy of the state ρA of system A
S(A) = S(S) + (t− 1) log 2. (11)
Proof: Consider a set A of t shares. Let G′j , X
′
and Z′ be
the operatorsGj , X and Z restricted to the qubit positions in A
respectively for every 1 ≤ j ≤ 2t−2. Then these 2t operators
are independent because of Lemma 7. Since |0L〉〈0L| and
|1L〉〈1L| commute with G′j for every j and also with Z , we
can write
ρ0A = trAc(|0L〉〈0L|) =
1
2t
I⊗t + β0R; (12)
ρ1A = trAc(|1L〉〈1L|) =
1
2t
I⊗t + β1R, (13)
where R ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}⊗t, R 6= I⊗t and 0 < |β0|, |β1| ≤
1/2t. The operator R cannot commute with X ′, since then it
would commute with 2t independent operators, which would
imply that R = I⊗t. Therefore, since R and X ′ are tensor
products of Pauli matrices, R anti-commutes with X ′. Hence,
because X ′ trAc(|0L〉〈0L|)X ′† = trAc(|1L〉〈1L|), we have
that β0 = −β1.
Furthermore, ρ0A has 2t−1 eigenvalues equal to 1/2t + β0
and 2t−1 equal to 1/2t− β0, because R has 2t−1 eigenvalues
equal to +1 and 2t−1 equal to −1. We also know that
S(ρ0A) = S(ρ0Ac) = (t − 1) log 2, since |0L〉〈0L| has zero
entropy. Therefore, we have that β0 = ±1/2t. Analogously
for β1.
Finally, by using the fact that α0 + α1 = 1, we are able to
verify that the entropy of ρA is given by Eq. (11), since ρA
has 2t−1 eigenvalues equal to 1/2t(1 + α0 − α1) and 2t−1
equal to 1/2t(1− α0 + α1).
Lemma 11: Let A ⊆ P with |A| ≥ t. Then
S(A) = S(S) + (2t− 1− |A|) log 2. (14)
Proof: Write A = At ∪ A′, where |At| = t and |A′| =
|A| − t ≤ t − 1. Let B = P \ A. Then by using Lemmas 9
and 10 we have
S(A) ≥ |S(At)− S(A′)|
= S(S) + (2t− 1− |A|) log 2,
S(A) = S(RB)
≤ S(R) + S(B)
= S(S) + (2t− 1− |A|) log 2,
which completes the proof.
Finally, we have the following.
Theorem 12: A [[2t− 1, 1, t]] binary stabilizer code can be
used to share a secret according to a ((t, 2t− 1)) QTS.
Proof: Let A,B = P , such that B = P \A and |A| ≥ t.
Then
I(R : A) = S(R) + S(A)− S(B)
= 2S(S) = I(R : S).
Hence, the recoverability requirement is satisfied for any
authorized set of shares of Eq. (9) and since the threshold
scheme is pure, this completes the proof.
IV. MONOTONE SPAN PROGRAM CONSTRUCTION
In [8] it was shown how (classical) MSP can be used to
construct a QSS scheme for a general access structure. We
show that the recoverability and secrecy requirement are
fulfilled for this construction.
We only consider the pure state case. The recoverability and
secrecy requirement for the mixed scheme follow immediately
from the entropies for the pure scheme.
Let A be a self-dual adversary structure with corresponding
MSP (Fq,M, g) (see [2]), where q is a prime power, M
a d × e matrix over Fq with independent columns and g
a function that labels each row of M with an element of
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Furthermore, by H we denote a q-dimensional
Hilbert space and say the vectors that are labeled {|a〉}a∈Fnq
form an orthonormal basis for H⊗n.
Consider the following isometry.
Definition 13: The mapping VM : H⊗e → H⊗d is defined
by
VM
(∑
i∈Fq
αi|ψi1ψi2 . . . ψie〉
)
=
∑
i∈Fq
αi
∣∣∣∣∣M


ψi1
ψi2
.
.
.
ψie


〉
, (15)
where |ψi1ψi2 . . . ψie〉 ∈ H⊗e and αi ∈ C for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
We show that this mapping can be used to share a secret
according to a QSS with adversary structure A. Let the secret
S be an element of a q-dimensional Hilbert space HS with
orthonormal basis {|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |q−1〉}. Again, R denotes the
reference system that purifies S and P denotes the system of
the players. Let IR be the identity mapping on the system R.
The encoding of the secret is then given by
|RP 〉 = (IR ⊗ VM )(|RS〉 ⊗ |E〉), (16)
where
|E〉 = 1√
qe−1
∑
a∈Fe−1q
|a〉 (17)
and {|a〉}a∈Fe−1q is an orthonormal basis for HE , the Hilbert
space corresponding to system E.
This means that if the state of S is described by the density
matrix ρS , which has orthonormal decomposition
ρS =
∑
i∈Fq
αi|i〉〈i|, (18)
then the state of the system of the shares P together with the
reference system R is given by
|RP 〉 = 1√
qe−1
∑
i∈Fq
∑
a∈Fe−1q
√
αi |i〉 ⊗
∣∣∣M (i
a
)〉
. (19)
Finally, the dealer sends qudit i to player g(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Let A be an authorized set and B its unauthorized comple-
ment. To check the recoverability and secrecy requirement, we
compute the entropy of system A and B. By MA and MB we
denote the rows of M corresponding to A and B respectively,
where MA has rank l and MB rank m.
First, consider the following definition.
Definition 14: Let Bix be the set of vectors |i a1 · · ·ae−1〉
such that
MB(i, a1, . . . , ae−1)
⊤ = x, (20)
where i ∈ Fq, a = (a1, . . . , ae−1)⊤ ∈ Fe−1q and x ∈ im(MB).
Then the vector |φix〉 is defined by
|φix〉 =
1√
qe−m−1
∑
|ia〉∈Bix
∣∣∣MA(ia
)〉
. (21)
We claim that these vectors are the eigenvectors of the density
matrix ρA that describes the state of system A. To prove this,
we need the next lemma.
Lemma 15: Consider two vectors |φix〉 and |φi
′
x′〉 for certain
i, i′ ∈ Fq and x, x′ ∈ im(MB). Suppose there are vectors
|i a〉 ∈ Bix and |i′ a′〉 ∈ Bi
′
x′ such that∣∣∣MA(ia
)〉
=
∣∣∣MA(i′a′
)〉
.
Then we have that |φix〉 = |φi
′
x′〉. If there are no such vectors,
then 〈φix|φi
′
x′〉 = 0.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that with the assumptions
above, we have that for every |i b〉 ∈ Bix, there exist a vector
|i′ b′〉 ∈ Bi′x′ such that |MA(i, b)⊤〉 = |MA(i′, b′)⊤〉. This is
fulfilled by setting (i′, b′) = (i′, a′)− (i, a) + (i, b).
The second part follows immediately from the fact that we
labeled the vectors in such a way that they are orthonormal to
each other.
Lemma 16: For every i ∈ Fq and x ∈ im(MB), |φix〉 is an
eigenvector of ρA, which has norm equal to 1.
Proof: The density matrix for subsystem A is given by
ρA = trRB |RP 〉〈RP |
=
1
qe−1
∑
i∈Fq
αi
∑
x∈im(MB)∑
|ia〉,|ia′〉∈Bix
∣∣∣MA(ia
)〉〈
MA
(
i
a′
)∣∣∣
=
1
qm
∑
i∈Fq
αi
∑
x∈im(MB)
|φix〉〈φix|. (22)
Since M has independent columns and therefore its kernel
only contains the all zero vector, the vectors |φix〉 are correctly
normalized. Because of Lemma 15, we have that the vectors
|φix〉 are all (not necessarily different) eigenvectors of ρA,
which completes the proof.
In the next theorem, we compute the entropy of ρA by
calculating the eigenvalues of the eigenvectors of ρA.
Lemma 17: Let the matrix M have e independent columns
and let the rank of matrices MA and MB be l and m
respectively. Then we have
S(A) = S(S) + (m+ l − e) log q; (23)
S(B) = (m+ l − e) log q. (24)
Proof: Consider any vector |φix〉 for i ∈ Fq and x ∈
im(MB). Because of Lemma 15 and the fact that the kernel
of M only contains the all-zero vector, this vector is repeated
qe−l times in Eq. (22). Moreover, because of the properties
of the MSP and the fact that A is an authorized set, for all
these qe−l vectors |φi′x′〉 we have that i′ = i. Therefore, we
can write for ρA
ρA =
qe−l
qm
∑
i
αi
∑
t
|φit〉〈φit|, (25)
where the vectors |φit〉, with 1 ≤ t ≤ qm+l−e and 1 ≤ i ≤ q,
are all different. Moreover, the vectors |φit〉 are all eigenvectors
of ρA, each with eigenvalue αi/qm+l−e. Hence, it follows that
the entropy of system A is given by Eq. (23). The proof for
the entropy of system B is omitted here.
Finally, we have the following.
Theorem 18: For any adversary structure A, there exists a
QSS realizing A.
Proof: We only prove the case that A is self-dual, the
scheme for the other adversary structures can be obtained from
this one. In the case that A is self-dual, consider the scheme
given by Eq. (16). Let A ⊆ P,A /∈ A be an authorized set
and B = P \A. Then because of Lemma 17, we have
I(R : S) = S(R) + S(S)− S(RS) = 2S(S);
I(R : A) = S(R) + S(A)− S(B) = 2S(S),
where we have used the fact that systems RS and RAB are
in a pure state. The secrecy requirement is equivalent to the
recoverability requirement in this case, but can also be checked
directly.
V. QSS USING TELEPORTATION
We verify the correctness of the ((n, n)) QTS scheme
using teleportation as was proposed in [9]. This is done by
defining an equivalent scheme that does not use teleportation.
Let the state of the secret S be given by the density matrix
ρS = α0|0〉〈0|+ α1|1〉〈1|, where α0, α1 ∈ C. The state of S
together with its reference system R is then given by
|RS〉 = √α0|00〉+√α1|11〉. (26)
Suppose the dealer D and the n players P initially share the
maximally entangled state
|ψ〉DP = 1√
2
(|0 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〉+ |1 1 . . .1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〉). (27)
The first step in the teleportation scheme is that the dealer lets
the secret interact with his part of the entangled state and then
performs a Bell measurement on his two qubits. If he then
communicates the (classical) outcome of this measurement to
the players, they are able to obtain the state
|RP 〉 = √α0|0 0 . . .0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〉+√α1|1 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〉. (28)
In [9] it was shown how the players can obtain the state
of the secret if all of them cooperate. However, it was not
analyzed what happens if a group of less than n players
cooperate. This is done here by formulating an equivalent
protocol in terms of the information theoretical model. Let
the isometry Vn,n : C2 → (C2)⊗n be defined by
Vn,n(a|0〉+ b|1〉) = a| 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〉+ b| 1 . . .1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〉, (29)
where a, b ∈ C. The encoding of the secret by using telepor-
tation is then equivalent to applying the mapping IR⊗Vn,n to
the system RS, where IR is the identity mapping on system R.
However, the difference is, that with this mapping the dealer
actually has to send quantum shares to the players, while
otherwise he only has to perform a Bell measurement and
sending two classical bits.
Next, we calculate the mutual informations in order to
determine which sets of players are authorized. Let Pi be the
system of player i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then
ρP1 = α0|0〉〈0|+ α1|1〉〈1| (30)
ρP12 = α0|00〉〈00|+ α1|11〉〈11| (31)
.
.
.
ρP12...n = α0|0...0〉〈0...0|+ α1|1...1〉〈1...1|, (32)
hence the entropy of the system of an arbitrary set of players
equals the entropy of the secret. For the mutual informations,
we have
I(R : P1) = I(R : P12) = . . . =
I(R : P12...n−1) = S(S)
< I(R : S); (33)
I(R : P12...n) = 2S(S)
= I(R : S), (34)
since RP12...n is the only system with entropy not equal to
S(S), but equal to 0. Hence, a set of less than n players has
some information about the secret, but not enough to recover
it, while all n players together have enough information to
recover the secret. Therefore, we have shown that this scheme
is a non-perfect ((n, n)) QTS.
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